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ABSTRACT 
 
In our model, two profit-maximizing sellers sell a homogeneous good to Bayesian, risk-
neutral buyers in an online comparison shopping service. Buyers use a reputation system 
to update their beliefs about sellers. Buyers purchase from the seller that maximizes the 
buyer’s expected utility from the purchase. We find that the seller’s profit depends on the 
distribution of buyer beliefs. A degenerate distribution of beliefs implies either Bertrand 
competition or a monopolistic market. A non-degenerate distribution implies that both 
sellers can be profitable, if their reputations differ from each other. The seller with a 
higher reputation score receives a greater profit. If sellers are similar in every respect, the 
Bertrand equilibrium obtains. We test the theory with data from Pricegrabber using OLS 
and quantile regression. Controlling for different seller types, the evidence indicates that 
higher reputation scores may support price premiums.     
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1. Introduction 
 
The ease of comparing prices and product offerings increases efficiency in electronic 
markets. Designed for this purpose, comparison shopping services are electronic 
marketplaces that lower buyer search costs by gathering and distributing information 
about sellers1. The buyer that wishes to purchase some product uses the search engine of 
a comparison shopping website to receive a list of price quotes from the sellers that offer 
the desired product. As a result, the buyer can choose the most preferable offer from the 
available sellers in terms of price, delivery, payment and the seller’s quality.  
 
In the economic literature, comparison shopping services relate to information 
clearinghouse models. In Varian (1980), a fraction of buyers use the information 
clearinghouse, such as a newspaper, to locate the seller who sets the lowest price, 
whereas other buyers are evenly distributed among all sellers. As a result, buyer 
heterogeneity produces price dispersion. Baye and Morgan (2001) take information 
clearinghouse models to electronic markets. They suggest that an optimizing 
monopolistic operator of a comparison shopping service sets its fees for sellers high 
enough to induce some sellers to stay out of the service. In contrast, the fees for buyers 
are low enough to encourage full participation. In consequence, the prices are lower in 
the comparison shopping service than in the outside market, which encourages buyers to 
use the service. From the buyer’s perspective, comparison shopping markets may provide 
considerable increase in consumer surplus because it mitigates the buyer’s information 
costs and spurs competition among sellers. From the seller’s perspective, they could lead 
to cut-throat price competition, because there is little room for product differentiation and 
free entry erases supernormal profits.  
 
Despite the challenging market environment, empirical evidence shows that well-known 
e-commerce giants as well as less-known small firms participate in comparison shopping 
markets (Saastamoinen, 2008). Since the operators of comparison shopping websites 
                                                 
1These services are also known as a price comparison service or a price engine. See more details in 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Price_comparison_service. 
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often charge fees from the participating vendors, benefits from participation must exceed 
its costs for sellers. For a small firm, a comparison shopping market could bring visibility 
at low costs (Wan, 2006). Visibility is vital because buyers are aware of only a fraction of 
sellers in the market (Grover et al., 2006). To attract unaware buyers to their online 
stores, sellers have to advertise or organize promotional alliances with search engines 
(Latcovich & Howard, 2001; Filson, 2004). On the other hand, a firm must pursue an 
aggressive pricing strategy which restrains profitability. While incentives to participate in 
comparison shopping services are not obvious, some benefits from participation may 
exist. First, firms may organize periodical sales or inventory clear outs and occasionally 
win the bidding contest as suggested by Varian (1980). Second, as more buyers learn to 
use the search mechanisms of the Internet for commercial purposes, it is harder to 
maintain prices above the competitive level. Third, it gives an opportunity to monitor 
prices or issue a commitment to certain price level. Smith (2001) entertains a possibility 
that dominant sellers could use a comparison shopping service in collusion to maintain 
higher prices.  
 
Price alone cannot explain competition in comparison shopping markets because the 
problems of asymmetric information and moral hazard are inherent in e-markets. The 
lack of direct contact between buyers and sellers raises concerns about opportunistic 
fraudulent behavior (Friedman et al. 2000). In markets of perfect and complete 
information, every action an agent takes and the agent’s action history is observable to 
other agents rendering reputation irrelevant in such markets. Asymmetric information 
creates incentives to reputation building. Cabral (2005) defines reputation as “the 
situation when agents believe a particular agent to be something.” This belief may be 
crucial for commercial transactions to take place. For this reason, seller reputations may 
play a large role in competition. To address this problem, many e-commerce 
marketplaces have introduced reputation systems which gather and distribute aggregated 
information from buyers about the past behavior of sellers (Resnick et al., 2000). 
 
As the online business environment cultivates concerns over the trustworthiness of a 
trading partner, this may impede market entry because buyers trust the established firms 
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more than newcomers. Economic benefits of reputation building may explain the 
proliferation of reputation systems. First, reputation can be viewed as an asset. In Klein 
and Leffler (1981) and Shapiro (1983), a firm invests in reputation by selling high quality 
products at loss initially but earning a price premium on the established reputation later. 
To be qualified as an asset implies that established reputations can be bought. As a result, 
Mailath and Samuelson (2001) show that a reputation may not be a good signal of quality 
because incompetent firms buy good reputations. Second, Klein and Leffler (1981) 
suggest that consumers view reputation as a protection for contractual obligation. A price 
premium from reputation induces a firm to maintain good quality because the profit 
stream from good quality products exceeds the gains from cheating. Hörner (2002) 
argues that this does not provide sufficient incentives to maintain good quality. Instead, 
competition provides such incentives by creating an outside option to buyers who can 
patronize the seller’s rival, if they detect cheating on behalf of the seller. 
 
The comparison shopping services with reputation systems may provide simultaneously a 
low-cost entry point to the market as well as insulation from price competition. Zhou (et 
al. 2008) present a model for online markets, in which they show that a reputation system 
can reduce asymmetric information in an online market and replicate the results of 
Shapiro (1983). An efficient reputation system provides incentives to fulfill contractual 
obligations. There must also be incentives to participate and report truthful feedback 
through the reputation system. Bakos and Dellarocas (2003) show that an online 
reputation system can be more efficient in enforcing desired behavior than a threat of 
litigation process. 
 
In this paper, we present a theoretical model of interactions between buyers and sellers in 
a comparison shopping service with an integrated reputation system, and derive 
implications for competition. In addition, we test the model with empirical data from 
Pricegrabber, which is a popular online comparison shopping service. The paper proceeds 
as follows. In the second section, we present the theoretical model. In the third section, 
we test the model with least-squares regression (OLS) and quantile regression (QR). In 
the final section, we conclude the paper. 
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2. Model of Competition in Online Comparison Shopping Services 
 
2.1 Buyers 
 
Consider an electronic marketplace for a homogeneous good. The marketplace is a 
comparison shopping service with an integrated reputation system. A comparison 
shopping service is an electronic marketplace, where buyers receive simultaneously a list 
of price quotes for the desired product from all the sellers that participate in the 
comparison shopping service2. We assume that the use of the comparison shopping 
service is costless to buyers and sellers. A reputation system gathers and distributes 
information about a seller’s past behavior. The buyers that have transacted with the seller 
report their experience through a feedback mechanism. After this, aggregated buyer 
feedback is made publicly visible. This feedback profile forms the seller’s reputation in 
the marketplace. The reputation system of the comparison shopping service exists as long 
as the market exists, and all buyers elicit feedback after completed transactions.  
 
The overall market for the good consists of a mass of buyers normalized to one. Buyers 
enter the market in cohorts, one cohort in each period of time. A cohort buys at one seller 
or multiple sellers in each period t, Nt ,,0K= . Repeated purchases are possible. Buyers 
are utility maximizers that are concerned about the price of the good and the quality of 
service (Smith and Brynjolfsson, 2001). A fundamental distinction between types of 
goods was proposed by Nelson (1970) who categorizes them into search goods and 
experience goods. Price and/or quality comparisons precede consumption of search 
goods, whereas experience goods have to be consumed before their quality can be 
ascertained. As delivery often places a significant lag between purchase and consumption 
of a good, the entire transaction process could be considered as a good that has the 
characteristics of both good types. Comparison shopping services provide easy access to 
price information. However, the uncertainty over the overall purchase experience raises 
concerns about the seller’s trustworthiness.  
                                                 
2 Few examples of such websites include www.bizrate.com, www.pricegrabber.com and 
shopping.yahoo.com. 
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The quality of a transaction with the seller is discernible to the buyer after the transaction 
has been concluded. For simplicity, the buyer rates the transaction as a success or a 
failure. Therefore, the reputation system is similar to the binary system presented in 
Dellarocas (2004). In consequence, the feedback takes two values: “good” (G) for a 
successful transaction and “bad” (B) for a failure3. As the tth buyer elicits feedback on the 
seller, the reputation system updates the seller’s feedback profile by adding 11 += −tt GG  
if the feedback is good, or by adding 11 += −tt BB  if the feedback is bad. The initial 
values before are . Hence, a seller’s reputation in period t is the likelihood 
that a seller is good, which is given by the ratio 
000 == GB
 
 t
tt
t
t BG
GGoodPR γ=+=)( .        (1) 
 
Consequently, the likelihood that the seller is bad is ttt GoodPRBadPR γ−=−= 1)(1)( . 
In any given period, a seller’s public feedback profile, which is visible to all subsequent 
buyers and rival sellers, shows the likelihood that the seller is good ( tγ ) and the number 
of reviews the seller has received (t). The public feedback profile is a crude measure for a 
seller’s reputation when t is small, but its precision increases as a more feedback is being 
accumulated. A consistent feedback profile could provide the same proof as repeat 
purchases to quality-conscious on the seller’s commitment to maintain high quality 
service (Rao and Bergen, 1992). While switching one’s identity easy on the Internet, a 
large value of t signals the seller’s commitment to stay in the market under the same 
guise. As reputation building is a gradual, time-consuming process, a long market history 
implies greater costs of an identity switch to the seller. 
 
If the seller’s type is unknown to the buyer before a transaction, the buyer must assess the 
seller’s trustworthiness from the available information. Each buyer has a private signal 
]1,0[∈θ  (prior probability) on the seller’s type. The seller’s reputation can be interpreted 
                                                 
3 A candidate parameterized distribution for estimation would be the Beta-distribution. Equation (1) 
coincides with the expected value of Beta trials.  
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as a buyer’s belief of the seller’s true type (Cabral, 2005). It is easy to imagine numerous 
factors that could contribute toθ . For example, previous transactions with the seller could 
completely override the public information (Smith and Brynjolfsson, 2001). The buyer 
assigns 1=θ  (extremely favorable) or 0=θ  (extremely unfavorable) depending on her 
previous experience4. New buyers may have lower values for θ  in general, whereas 
experienced buyers are more trustful on sellers (or vice versa). Allowing for herd 
behavior, the buyer could also take cue from her immediate predecessor’s opinion by 
setting a low or high value for θ  to conform to the predecessors’ reviews. In addition, a 
price may signal the seller’s type (Doyle, 1990; Tirole, 1994). For now, we only assume 
that θ  is distributed according to some distribution with density )(θf . Priors for all 
sellers are drawn from this distribution. 
 
Infrequent purchases and a constant influx of new buyers into the market make the 
forming of seller reputations (Tirole, 1994). For this reason, an important piece of 
information is the public feedback profile provided by the previous buyers. This is an 
electronic counterpart to the word-of-mouth in the physical world (Resnick et al., 2000). 
We assume that the only communication mechanism between buyers is a reputation 
system, so other buyers’ private signals are only observable through their feedback. 
Moreover, a seller cannot be a buyer which prevents manipulation of sellers’ reputations.  
 
Buyers use the Bayes’ rule to obtain the posterior probability ),( γθµ  for the seller’s 
trustworthiness. The posterior probability obtained by Bayesian updating can be 
interpreted as the seller’s reputation (Cabral, 2005). The reputation system provides the 
public feedback profile ( ti ,γ ) of Seller i, which is the evidence-based likelihood that the 
particular seller is good, for any period t. The buyer’s prior probability that Seller i is 
good in period t is ti ,θ . After the transaction is concluded, the buyer elicits feedback 
through the reputation system, which updates the seller’s feedback profile. All 
                                                 
4 Notice that the absolute certainty on the seller’s type does not have any larger impact on subsequent 
buyers than uncertainty because only concluded transactions are registered. For this reason, only 1=θ  is 
indirectly observable to other buyers, whereas 0=θ  leads to the buyer abandoning the seller. 
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subsequent buyers benefit from the feedback given by their predecessors. In general, a 
buyer updates the posterior probability ti ,µ  by 
 
 
)1)(1( ,,
,
,
ttitti
tti
ti γθγθ
γθµ −−+= .      (2) 
 
Notice that if no transaction takes place, the next buyer has only the first buyer’s 
feedback at disposal. For this reason, the length of a ratings history may also provide 
important information about the seller’s quality.   
 
Suppose that buyers in the market are risk-neutral. They have identical valuations ( w ) for 
the homogeneous good. Let k denote the cost of an unsuccessful transaction, and . 
Given the posterior probability the buyer’s expected value V of the good is 
kw >
 
 ))(1( kwV −−+⋅= µµ .       (3) 
 
Equation (3) can be simplified by dividing it with w, so the value of the good to the buyer 
is 1. To simplify the analysis, assume that 0=k . This could be interpreted as the third 
party, such as a credit card company, bearing the cost of misdemeanor, or the good being 
low in value. Let 
w
Vv = . As a result, Equation (3) simplifies to 
 
 µ=v .          (4) 
 
The value of the good to the buyer depends only on the buyer’s posterior probability that 
the seller’s type is good. This is the buyer’s reservation price for the good that is  
purchased from the specific seller.  
 
Buyers seek to maximize their (expected) utility (u ) 
 
 pu −= µ ,         (5) 
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 where  is the set of prices. The utility is increasing in ]1,0[∈p µ  and decreasing in p. 
Clearly, transactions take place only if p≥µ . Moreover, Equation (5) implies that risk-
neutral buyers buy from the seller that guarantees them the highest (expected) surplus.  
 
Since µ  implies that buyers also care about the level of service, we assume that there 
exists a price that buyers consider too low for a seller to provide sufficient service. We 
assume that this price is common knowledge. This sets a lower bound to the set of 
possible prices. Any price below the lower bound signals with certainty that the seller’s 
type is bad. Klein and Leffler (1981) show that consumers can use price to judge the 
quality of a firm’s products. Their model suggests that consumers are able to distinguish 
the situations in which the price is too low to produce quality products.  
 
2.2 Sellers  
 
Sellers are retailers in a vertical market structure. The good is produced by an upstream 
manufacturer. The upstream market is competitive and thus, the manufacturer’s price  
(the wholesale price) equals to the manufacturer’s marginal cost. Sellers maximize their 
profit in the downstream market. There is no vertical integration between the upstream 
manufacturer and downstream retailers. Since the upstream market is competitive, the 
linear pricing contract in the vertical market structure is admissible and sellers take  as 
given (Tirole, 1994).  
wp
wp
 
Sellers face two strategy variables. Strategy variables are choice variables that affect a 
seller’s rivals profits or the payoffs accruing to buyers, or both (Doyle, 1990). First, the 
seller selects a retail price p. The choice is effectively constrained by the monopolist from 
below and the buyers’ maximum willingness to pay (µ ) from above. Thus, ],[ µwpp∈ . 
Second, the seller chooses a level of effort denoted by  after the buyer makes a 
purchase. For example, effort could be understood as effective customer service, 
measures that secure confidentiality in an electronic transaction, fast delivery, and so 
e
 8
forth. Effort enters as a cost per unit sold in the seller’s profit function. Let  be a 
continuous choice on . The seller’s profit function is then 
e
),0[ ∞
 
 ][),( eppep w −−= λπ ,       (6) 
 
where ]1,0[∈λ  is the fraction of buyers the seller receives (we define this measure later). 
There is a mass of buyers normalized to one in the market in each period. This 
assumption allows us to split the market between sellers if a buyer cohort receives an 
equal surplus from both of them. 
 
The level of effort has an indirect impact on a seller’s reputation. The probability of a 
successful transaction is increasing in the level of effort. For this reason, even good 
sellers occasionally disappoint buyers, but the seller’s reputation score is a good 
approximation of the level of effort the seller has chosen in the past. By taking high 
effort, the seller increases the probability that the buyer has a positive experience with the 
seller and the resulting feedback is positive.  
 
2.3 Market 
 
For simplicity, Suppose that there are two sellers in the marketplace, Seller h and Seller l. 
In any period, a competitive price cannot be equal to the wholesale price . If a 
seller sets its price equal to the wholesale price, it signals to the buyer that the seller 
chooses zero effort. The buyer concludes that the seller must be a bad seller and assigns 
wpp =
0=θ . Since this leads to 0== µv , the only possible price that a transaction could take 
place is . But this means that 0=p wpp <=0  and the seller loses money. Hence, the 
seller is always better off with  and wpp > wpp =  cannot be a Nash-equilibrium 
strategy. In consequence, the seller that chooses no effort has always an incentive to 
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mimic the seller that selects a positive level of effort. Thus, a bad type can be signaled 
with certainty but a good type cannot.5
 
Consider now a one-period game when two sellers are identical in every respect. As a 
result, this is simply a repetition of the Bertrand equilibrium, in which sellers undercut 
each other by ε  until the market price equals the marginal cost. The market equilibrium 
obtains at the competitive price 
 
epp w −≡          (7) 
 
where e  is the minimum level of effort that enables a successful fulfillment of the 
transaction. This price yields the normal profit that includes the opportunity cost forgone 
in an alternative investment. Hence any price above p  is a dominated strategy. However, 
any price below p  is also a dominated strategy because it signals zero effort to buyers. 
Thus, the seller who sets  is always better off by setting 0=e pp ≥ . If the seller chooses 
, its expected profit is 0>e 0][
2
1),( =−−= eppep wπ . If 0=e  is selected, this yields 
the profit 0][
2
1)0,( >−= wpppπ . The dominant strategy in the one-period game is to 
select )0,( p  which maximizes the seller’s profit. However, rational buyers could expect 
this and conclude that the seller is bad and assign 0=θ . As a result, the market unravels 
due to asymmetric information in the one-period game.  
 
Obviously, a market exists as long as buyers believe that good sellers that are committed 
to stay in the market with some positive probability exist. A multi-period game requires a 
device that signals the seller’s commitment to quality to buyers. Dellarocas (2004) shows 
that a binary reputation system provides sufficient incentives for a seller to maintain good 
quality. In his model, cooperating sellers and cheating sellers both produce good quality 
and bad quality with positive probabilities. As a result, even good sellers, though not as 
                                                 
5 A duopoly model can be easily expanded to comprise more sellers. 
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frequently as bad sellers, produce occasionally bad quality which is reported to buyers by 
the reputation system. Corresponding to their reputation profiles, sellers adjust their 
prices to maximize profit. We assume that sellers find it worthwhile to induce effort, 
which is reflected by their reputation profiles.    
 
The distribution of buyer beliefs is crucial in determining seller profits. A degenerate 
distribution means that all buyer priors satisfy ii ∀∈= ]1,0[θθ , which implies 
homogeneous buyer population. This has stark consequences on market structure. First, 
suppose that lh γγ > . Then Seller h wins the price competition in every period. Since any 
pp <  signals that the seller chooses zero effort, this is clearly a dominated strategy. 
Hence, Seller h can always offer a higher surplus to every buyer. Moreover, it can 
gradually increase the price such that  without losing customers because of 
increasing buyer satisfaction. This gives a strong incentive to sustain  because 
cheating, if detected, undermines the seller’s pricing power and lowers the future profits. 
Second, if the sellers are identical, which occurs when 
1→p
0>e
γγγ == lh , the Bertrand 
equilibrium obtains. This could be a stable equilibrium. Suppose that a seller is tempted 
to select , “to cheat”, because this could result in a short run profit provided that 
buyers do not detect cheating. Still, the seller cannot charge a higher price after a 
successful deviation because it shares 
0=e
γ  with its rival. However, the probability that 
buyers detect cheating increases with 0=e . If the seller is caught cheating and the rival 
does not cheat, this gives the upper hand to the competitor with every period forward 
because its reputation score is higher. As a consequence, the cheating seller can be driven 
out of the market. 
 
A non-degenerate distribution of private signals implies heterogeneity in buyer beliefs. 
Thus, some buyers are extremely pessimistic on sellers while others display extreme 
optimism. Assume that the distribution of buyer beliefs is independently distributed on 
],[ θθ . Let )(θF  denote the proportion of buyers with prior beliefs of θ  or less about the 
seller’s type (since )(θF  is non-degenerate, there are at least two types of prior beliefs).  
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Buyer heterogeneity influences a seller’s profitability. If the sellers are identical, that 
is γγγ == lh , the usual argument of epsilon price cutting drives the price down to p . 
Buyers with beliefs of ],[ θθθ ∈  or greater which satisfy 0),( =− pγθµ  buy the good 
from either seller. As a result, the Bertrand equilibrium obtains in each period regardless 
of the buyer distribution. The sellers split the market and each seller earns zero profit. 
 
Is there an incentive to choose zero effort in this setting?  Obviously, selecting “no effort” 
yields 0)(][
2
1)0,( >−= ∫θ
θ
θπ dFppp w  at least once. If cheating is detected, the seller’s 
rating score is lower in the next period (this occurs also if positive effort has resulted in a 
bad rating). Surprisingly, this may increase profits for both sellers. Suppose that 
tlth ,, γγ >  in period t. Then tlth ,, µµ >  for all ],[ θθθ ∈  when ppp lh ==  which means 
that all buyers place a higher value for Seller h’s offer. This gives an opportunity to Seller 
h to increase its price above p  and make profit. Any ),(),( ,,,, thththth p γθµγθµ ≤≤  
dominates p  because it yields higher profit than playing the Bertrand equilibrium. It is 
obvious that Seller h could force Seller l out of the market and still make profit by 
choosing the price  such that the consumer surplus when buyers buy from Seller h  hp
 
  ∫∫ −>− θ
θ
θ
θ
θµθµ )(][)(][ ,, dFpdFp tlhth .      (8) 
 
However, this choice may not maximize the profit of Seller h. Instead, an interval ],[ *θθ  
which results in 
 
 0)(][)(][
*
*
*
,
*
, ≥−>− ∫∫ θ
θ
θ
θ
θµθµ dFpdFp hthltl ,      (9) 
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where ppp lh ≥> **  are the prices that solve the profit maximization problems, may yield 
higher profits for both sellers. Equation (9) states that Seller h may ignore the most 
optimistic buyers with  and set prices high enough to sell the good to the buyers 
whose beliefs are drawn from 
*θθ >
],[ *θθ . In essence, Seller h extracts surplus from the more 
distrustful buyers. As buyers maximize surplus, the most optimistic buyers purchase from 
Seller l which has to sell the good at a strictly lower price than Seller h.     
 
Since sellers know each other’s reputation profiles and the updating mechanism of 
buyers, they can compute the lower bound for priors that yield a non-negative surplus to 
buyers. For example, with a choice of price  and the given reputation profile hp th,γ , the 
lower bound for the priors that yield non-negative surplus to buyers is 
 
 
)21(
)1(
)(
,,
,
thhth
hth
hh p
p
p γγ
γθ −+
−= .      (10) 
 
We denote the absolute lower bound by )( pθ  which is the prior that induces a buyer to 
buy with the lowest possible price. The lower bound is increasing in p  and decreasing in 
γ .  In consequence, the minimum profit of Seller h is on the interval ],[ lh θθ  because 
Seller l cannot set any lower price that could expand its market. Thus, by raising the price 
a seller loses customers among the more pessimistic buyers but this increases revenue 
from the more optimistic buyers. Lowering the price attracts more customers from both 
ends of the buyer distribution but decreases the overall revenue per customer. As a result, 
the seller selects  that maximizes its profit. This may preclude some pessimistic buyers 
from the market because the decrease in the revenue per customer may more than offset 
the additional revenue from the increased market size. 
*p
 
The upper bound for Seller h is obtained by solving for θ  in equation 
 
 ltllhthh pp −=− ),(),( ,, γθµγθµ       (11) 
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 which sets the surpluses equal between the two sellers. We assume that the seller with a 
better reputation receives buyers that are indifferent between the two sellers. Let 
),,,( ,, tlthlh pp γγθ  denote the solution to this problem6. By implicit differentiation of 
Equation (11), we notice that 
 
 
01
01
<
∂
∂−∂
∂−=
>
∂
∂−∂
∂=
θ
µ
θ
µ
θ
θ
µ
θ
µ
θ
lhl
lhh
dp
d
dp
d
       (12) 
 
because a marginal increase in hµ  is greater than in lµ  when θ  increases7. Thus, the 
upper bound for Seller h increases if Seller h lowers its price and decreases if Seller l 
lowers its price. Also, let θ  denote the absolute upper limit of the distribution of buyer 
priors. 
 
In each period, Seller h sets the price  which maximizes its profit 
 given that Seller l sets the price that maximizes its profit.  Seller l optimizes its 
profit in a similar manner. Seller h earns a price premium of , in 
which 
)|( ** llhh pppp =
),( ** ephhπ
)(** lhlh pp µµ −+=
)( lh µµ −  is Seller h’s return on reputation. Thus, the profit of Seller h is 
 
 ∫ −−
*
*
)()( *
θ
θ
θdFepp wh ,       (13) 
 
where ),( ,
**
tkhp γθθ =  and ),,,( ,,*** tlthlh pp γγθθ = . As a result, the buyer with a private 
signal θ  receives surplus from the sellers according to 
                                                 
6 The solution for this problem is available from the author upon request. 
7 See Appendix. 
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  .
if,0
],[andif,0
if,0
*
*
*
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
<<
∈==
>>
−
θθ
θθθθθ
θθ
lh vv      (14) 
 
The profit of Seller l is 
 
 ∫ −−θ
θ
θ
*
)()( * dFepp wl ,        (15) 
     
and 
 
 ∫∫ −−≥−− θ
θ
θ
θ
θθ
*
*
*
)()()()( ** dFeppdFepp wlwh .    (16) 
 
The optimal prices depend on the distribution of buyer beliefs and the seller’s reputation. 
These support various market structures. A degenerate buyer distribution leads into a 
monopolistic market in which Seller h takes over the entire market extracting all 
consumer surplus. A non-degenerate buyer distribution may produce price dispersion. 
Seller h maximizes its profit from the buyer population whose priors are drawn from the 
interval ],[
** θθ . Seller l receives the demand from the more optimistic buyers whose 
prior beliefs are drawn from the interval ],(
* θθ . Notice that if θθ =* , Seller h takes 
over the entire market. Seller h’s profit is at least as high as Seller l’s profit, because 
Seller h can always undercut Seller l by a small amount and make profit. Profit-
maximizing may also dictate that a part of the market, ),[ *θθ , may not be serviced 
because the additional revenue from the lower segment of the market does not offset the 
loss of income in the upper segment. 
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Since reputation scores are public knowledge, both can use Equation (2) to compute 
reservation price paths for the known or expected distribution of buyer beliefs. Using 
Equation (5), sellers can experiment with prices that maximize their profits. If buyers 
place value on seller reputations, both firms may be able to sell their products in the 
market with supernormal profit and without collusion. Consequently, price dispersion 
may result from this because reputation provides pricing power. Since even good sellers 
receive bad reviews occasionally, prices may fluctuate as sellers adjust their prices to 
maximize profits in their reputation profiles.  
 
The model explicitly shows that the distribution of buyers’ private signals impacts 
sellers’ profits. One could conjecture that new buyers might have lower priors which 
benefits more reputable sellers. As long as e-markets grow in size, which means that the 
share of new buyers in the market is steady or increasing, maintaining a good reputation 
is a profitable strategy. This offers rationale for well-known vendors to have presence in 
highly competitive comparison shopping services because their existing reputations may 
provide opportunities for premium pricing. However, a shift in distribution towards 
higher priors, which could happen when buyers become more experienced, may diminish 
the value of a good reputation in favor of more aggressive price competition. Moreover, 
this model offers an explanation for the observed price dispersion in online markets, 
which has been a finding in numerous studies (e.g. Brynjolfsson and Bakos (2000); 
Ancarani and Shankar (2004); Leiter and Warin (2007)). 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
 
We test the theory of competition with reputations in a comparison shopping service with 
the data from two-seller markets listed in Pricegrabber, which is one of the most popular 
comparison shopping websites8. We use a portion of the data that was analyzed in 
Saastamoinen (2008). The sample data was obtained from Pricegrabber in May 2008. It 
consists of prices for various goods ranging from consumer electronics to auto parts. 
Pricegrabber has a reputation system which provides rating scores for each seller. A 
                                                 
8 For more details about the website, see www.pricegrabber.com. 
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rating score, which ranges from 1 (the lowest) to 5 (the highest), is aggregated from 
buyer feedback. We approximate seller reputations with the rating scores. 
 
To test the theory, it is important to control for different seller types. One way is to use 
the two seller packages offered by Pricegrabber as a controlling device. A merchant runs 
its own e-commerce websites and pays a click-through rate to Pricegrabber for buyers 
that are redirected to the merchant’s website by Pricegrabber. A storefront pays a 
commission to Pricegrabber for each commercial transaction, but it does not run an own 
e-commerce website. Consequently, storefronts rely on the comparison shopping service 
as their only sales channel, while merchants use the service to lure in price-conscious 
buyers. Small sellers are likely to select the storefront package, whereas other sellers opt 
for the merchant package. The dummy variable SF denotes storefronts. In addition, we 
use the Internet Retailer’s list of the largest e-commerce retailers to control for the largest 
sellers9. These are large companies whose brands may provide them some insulation 
from price competition in e-markets, because buyers view brands as a proxy for 
reliability (Smith, 2002). The dummy variable TOP500 denotes large e-commerce 
vendors.  
 
As the sample consist of two-seller markets, we calculate the difference in prices as 
 
 ,        (17) minmax kkk ppPDIF −=
 
in which  ( ) is the maximum (minimum) price observed in the market k. Since 
, it follows that .  
max
kp
min
kp
minmax
kk pp ≥ 0≥kPDIF
 
Due to diversity of product categories in the sample, product values vary considerably. 
For this reason, the pecuniary value of price differences may naturally be greater in 
expensive products than in relatively low priced products. To make price differences 
                                                 
9 See www.internetretailer.com. 
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more comparable, we take a logarithmic transformation of . The logarithmic 
transformation must be defined as 
kPDIF
 
 )        (18) 1( += kk PDIFLogLPDIF
 
because the difference between prices can be zero. Obviously, also . 0≥kLPDIF
 
We calculate also a difference between reputation scores. This is 
  
minmax
kkk rrRDIF −= ,        (19) 
 
in which  ( ) is the reputation score of the seller that sets the maximum 
(minimum) price observed in the market k. Taking a logarithmic transformation also from 
 provides a straightforward interpretation of regression coefficients as elasticities.  
The logarithmic transformation of requires scaling of . This is done by 
max
kr
min
kr
kRDIF
kRDIF
 
      (20) )1||( min ++= RDIFRDIFLogLRDIF kk
  
where  is the absolute value of the minimum of  in all k markets. || minRDIF kRDIF
 
Descriptive statistics of the sample are shown in Table 1. They indicate that the mean 
(median) of price differences is greater in markets where storefronts and Top500-sellers 
operate, whereas the range of price differences is greater in all markets. In contrast, the 
mean (median) of differences in rating scores is higher in all the sample than in either 
control group. Storefronts and Top500-sellers did not overlap each other in this sample. 
Altogether, the control groups account for 15 per cent of the markets. 
As a test hypothesis for regression analysis, we expect a positive relationship between 
 and . Higher prices should correlate with higher reputation scores. This 
correlation might emerge in the markets where storefronts are active because unlike other 
kLPDIF kLRDIF
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sellers, storefronts have a limited access or no access to the markets outside the 
comparison shopping service. As a consequence, storefront sales are mode dependent on 
the reputation-price tradeoff. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics. 
Statistic LPDIF SF* 
LPDIF 
TOP500* 
LPDIF 
LRDIF SF* 
LRDIF 
TOP500* 
LRDIF 
Mean 0.913 2.352 1.675 1.625 0.102 1.506 
Median 0.000 2.321 1.295 1.758 0.000 1.609 
Maximum 8.355 6.512 7.963 2.169 2.158 2.015 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Std. Dev. 1.448 1.555 1.733 0.256 0.395 0.325 
Obs. 1429 91 128 1429 91 128 
 
 
We devise a log-linear regression model to test the theory. A log-linear functional form 
provides a convenient interpretation for estimates: a one unit increase in the difference 
between rating scores increases the difference between prices by  per cent. The 
regression equation is  
100ˆ ⋅β
 
 
kkk
kkkkkk
RDIFTOP
LRDIFSFRDIFTOPSFCLPDIF
εβ
ββ
+⋅+
⋅++++=
500
500  
3
21 . (21) 
 
The results from OLS-regression with White Heteroskedasticity Consistent Estimates 
(HSCE) are reported in Table 2. Excluding the dummy variables for the controlled 
groups, all estimates prove statistically significant. OLS estimates for the regression 
constant and dummy constants indicate that the difference between prices is higher in 
markets where storefronts and Top500-sellers are active than in all markets. The impact 
of an increase in the difference between rating scores varies. The general effect is 
negative (-0.815). This implies that a one per cent increase in the difference between 
rating scores decreases the difference between prices by -0.8 per cent. In contrast, the 
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control groups display a positive dependency. Together with , the estimates for 
storefronts (1.931) correspond to 1.1 per cent increase in the price difference.  
overshadows the positive coefficient of Top500-sellers (0.655) yielding a mild decrease 
of -0.2 per cent when the difference between rating scores increases by a one per cent. 
Hence, the evidence suggests that reputation has an impact on a seller’s pricing especially 
in the markets where storefronts are active.  
1βˆ
1βˆ
 
Table 2. OLS Estimates for  with HSCE. kLPDIF
Coefficient C SF TOP500 
1βˆ  2βˆ  3βˆ  
Value 2.059*** 
(0.243) 
-1.495 
(1.102) 
-0.143 
(0.557) 
-0.815*** 
(0.142) 
1.931*** 
(0.697) 
0.655* 
(0.368) 
Regression 
Statistics 
Adjusted R2 0.117 F-Statistic 38.920***
 
Obs. 1429 
*** p-value<0.01; ** p-value<0.05; * p-value<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
The histogram of OLS residuals and the Jarque-Bera test for normality in Figure 1 
indicate the distribution of residuals is not normal. Since the value of a good may be 
important in consumer’s decision-making, we test the robustness of the results with 
quantile regression (QR). QR provides information about how changes in covariates 
impact in different points of the distribution of the response variable. Estimates are 
obtained for 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75 quantiles. The results of quantile process are presented in 
Table 3. QR estimates for 0.5 quantile corresponds to the median, which is a 
semiparametric alternative to OLS. Therefore, it is interesting to see that the estimates for 
0.5 quantile do not agree with OLS. The intercept decreases in magnitude to 0.155. Also, 
the dummy for Top500-sellers becomes positive and statistically significant at 2.246. All 
estimates for storefronts are statistically insignificant. The estimates for all markets is -
0.085 and for Top500-sellers -0.793. These correspond to -0.1 per cent and -0.9 per cent 
decreases in the difference between prices when the difference between ratings increases 
by a one percent. Thus, the median regression does not provide empirical evidence for the 
test hypothesis. 
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Series: Residuals
Observations 1429
Mean      -4.07e-15
Median  -0.581804
Maximum  7.632724
Minimum -2.629295
Std. Dev.   1.358467
Skewness   1.677191
Kurtosis   5.960716
Jarque-Bera  1191.888
Probability  0.000000
 
 Figure 1. Histogram and Normality Test of OLS Residuals. 
 
The tails of the distribution of the dependent variable provide some empirical evidence 
for the theory. In the lower tail (0.25 quantile), the only statistically significant estimates 
are for Top500-sellers. TOP500 is 1.953 and  is -1.214 which indicates that the 
marginal effect is -1.2 per cent negative. In the upper tail (0.75 quantile), on the other 
hand, all estimates are statistically significant. The intercept and dummies are range from 
-2.618 to 5.119. Overall, there is a difference between prices that ranges from 5.1 percent 
to 2.5 per cent. The marginal effect for the general population is negative (-2.535) which 
implies -2.5 per cent decrease. In contrast, the estimates for the control groups are 
positive. The estimated coefficients for storefronts (3.120) and Top500-sellers (2.847) 
correspond to 0.6 per cent and 0.3 per cent, respectively, increases in the difference 
between prices. These results imply that a reputation may enable price premiums 
especially when buyers purchase more valuable goods. As a conclusion, QR estimates 
provide mixed evidence about positive dependency between  and .  
3βˆ
kLPDIF kLRDIF
 
These two regressions provide empirical evidence that reputation scores may explain 
price differences in electronic markets. The results from OLS give some support to the 
theory that a positive relationship between prices and reputation scores results from 
sellers’ profit-maximizing behavior. While QR does not agree with OLS entirely, it 
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implies that seller reputations are more important in the upper tail of the distribution of 
the dependent variable. Intuitively, this is hardly surprising because the pecuniary value 
of price differences is greater among more valuable goods. A greater value of a good 
implies potential for a greater financial loss to the buyer. Therefore, a seller whose 
reputation score is higher than its rival may charge higher prices in a market of zero 
search costs for price information. 
 
Table 3. Quantile Regression Estimates for . kLPDIF
Coefficient 
Quantile 
C SF TOP500 
1βˆ  2βˆ  3βˆ  
0.25 0.000 
(0.087) 
-1.506 
(1.717) 
1.954*** 
(0.572) 
0.000 
(0.051) 
1.530 
(1.018) 
-1.214*** 
(0.364) 
0.50 0.155* 
(0.083) 
2.136 
(4.026) 
2.426*** 
(0.445) 
-0.085* 
(0.048) 
0.104 
(2.486) 
-0.793** 
(0.369) 
0.75 5.119*** 
(0.794) 
-2.618* 
(1.472) 
-2.538*** 
(0.822) 
-2.535*** 
(0.534) 
3.120*** 
(0.943) 
2.847*** 
(0.580) 
Regression 
Statistics 
(0.50) 
Adjusted 
R2
0.095 Quasi-LR 
Statistic 
625.237*** 
 
Obs. 1429 
*** p-value<0.01; ** p-value<0.05; * p-value<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we present a model of duopoly competition for a comparison shopping 
service which has an integrated reputation system. Electronic marketplaces that provide 
comparison shopping services have become widespread in retail e-commerce. These 
services reduce buyer’s search costs by providing price quotes from several sellers for the 
buyer’s benefit. Since buyers may feel that risks of an e-commerce transaction are greater 
than in a conventional commercial transaction, e-marketplaces have introduced reputation 
systems to reduce the risks of asymmetric information. 
We assume Bayesian buyers with heterogeneous beliefs about seller types. Buyers use 
the reputation system to update their beliefs about seller types. A profit-maximizing seller 
takes into account buyer beliefs, its rating score and its rival’s reputation score in its 
pricing decision. We find that sellers may earn supernormal profits as returns to their 
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reputations. The seller that has a better reputation earns higher profit than its rival. If 
sellers are identical, competition erases supernormal profits. Since even good sellers 
occasionally disappoint buyers, sellers adjust their prices to maximize profits in their 
current reputation profiles. For this reason, market prices are likely to fluctuate and price 
dispersion emerges. 
 
We test the theory with the price and rating score data from Pricegrabber, which is a 
popular comparison shopping website. We find evidence that there is a positive 
dependency between prices and reputation scores. This is especially evident among 
sellers whose only sales channel is the comparison shopping service. Moreover, well-
known e-commerce sellers may be able to leverage their existing reputations and charge 
price premiums. Quantile regression reveals that this may be especially true among more 
valuable goods where the buyer’s pecuniary risks are higher. 
 
In conclusion, this paper proposes a theory and evidence why a good reputation could be 
a valuable asset in e-commerce. For this reason, a seller may find it profitable to keep 
consumer satisfaction at a high level at least initially to gain competitive advantage later. 
As a direction for future research, it would be interesting to find out, how much weight 
consumers actually place on sellers’ reputation profiles in their purchase decisions. Also, 
a detailed view of which actions taken by the seller increase consumer satisfaction and 
lead to higher rating scores would provide valuable information to e-commerce vendors.  
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Appendix 
 
To show that the condition in (12) holds, it must be that θ
µ
θ
µ
∂
∂≥∂
∂ lh . First, use Equation 
(2) for both types and differentiate in respect of θ . We obtain 
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It can be shown that [ ]2)1)(1( )12()1)(1( hh hhhh h γθγθ
γγθ
γθγθ
γ
−−+
−≥−−+  because manipulating 
the inequality yields 0)1(1 ≥− hγθ , which is true because ]1,0[∈hγ . Since the right-hand 
side of (A1) is analogous to the left-hand side, we can rearrange Equation (A1) to 
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Consider now the left-hand side of Equation (A2). For equation to hold, it must be that 
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Equation (A3) reduces to 
 
 lh γγ > ,         (A4) 
 
which holds with strict inequality because lh γγ >  by definition. 
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